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Peer Review Protection: The Pennsylvania
Approach at the Crossroads
I. Introduction
The ethical conflict of professionalism' is particularly apparent
in the area of medical regulation. Although the medical profession
has been actively regulated for over a century,2 the modern practice
of medicine has produced unique problems for the medico-legal com-
munity. In this context, one must give particular attention to the
medical malpractice problems and to society's response to growing
concerns about the quality of medical care.
Implementation of peer review4 is one approach to insuring
quality medical care. This particular method of quality review, how-
ever, is particularly susceptible to manifestations of the ethical con-
flict of professionalism.5 The medical community steadfastly main-
1. This conflict has been defined as the conflict between the rights of a profession, the
rights of the government, and the rights of society generally. The conflict manifests itself as
the professional seeks to maintain his integrity and remain free from bureaucratic controls,
while the government seeks to regulate the professional's conduct to protect the public from
incompetent practitioners of the profession. Feinstein, Special Report: The Ethics of Profes-
sional Regulation, 312 NEw ENG. J. MED. 801 (1985).
2. For a discussion of the Pennsylvania history of medical regulation, see Comment,
Pennsylvania Law of Hospital Supervision: Its Origin and Present Meaning, 51 TEMP. L.Q.
187 (1978).
3. The medical malpractice problem has been described as having reached crisis pro-
portions. This "crisis" is the product of many factors "including a disturbing level of negligent
and improper medical care, frequently unrealistic patient expectations, and the growing 'phi-
losophy of entitlement' which is rampant among Americans." Hall, Medical Malpractice
Problem, 443 ANNALS 82 (1979). Physicians view the "crisis" as the result of spiraling liabil-
ity insurance costs and overly litigious plaintiff attorneys. See American Medical Association,
PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY IN THE '80S (pts. 1-3) (1984-1985) [hereinafter cited as PROFES-
SIONAL LIABILITY IN THE '80s]. Attorneys, on the other hand, are of the opinion that the
"crisis" is attributable to excessive amounts of medical negligence. See Association of Trial
Lawyers of America, THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION IS WRONG - THERE IS No
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE CRISIS (1985) [hereinafter cited as THE AMA Is
WRONG].
4. Peer review is that process by which the medical profession regulates itself. A panel
of medical professionals will review the work of their colleagues to determine if proper care
was administered in a particular situation. For a discussion of the various forms in which this
review takes place, see infra notes 48-65 and accompanying text. It should be noted that "a
peer review committee is not a court. Its purpose is not to determine guilt or to impose punish-
ment. Rather, its purpose is to evaluate and to improve the quality of medical care in a given
area." Suber, Peer Review: A Legal Update, 46 CONN. MED. 651 (1982).
5. Because peer review is an attempt at self-regulation of a highly trained professional
community, physicians have determined that they can best conduct reviews of their peers by
remaining free from government interference. The government, on the other hand, feels with-
out outside influences there will be no incentive to perform proper review. For a more complete
discussion of the debate surrounding peer review, see infra notes 66-93 and accompanying text.
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tains that there is no "crisis" in the quality of medical care."
Consequently, physicians contend that they are capable of effectively
monitoring the quality of medical care without outside interference.7
On the other hand, the legal community maintains that the medical
malpractice "crisis" continues simply because physicians are treating
patients negligently.8 It is argued that physicians perpetuate a "con-
spiracy of silence"' and do not effectively police themselves in an
attempt to ignore the problem. Thus, monitoring medical care can-
not proceed without outside involvement."l As a direct result of this
conflict over self-regulation, medical malpractice litigation has begun
to focus on the discoverability of documents produced during the
peer review process..
This comment will explore the discoverability issue created by
the implementation of peer review. This discussion begins with an
overview of medical malpractice problems followed by an examina-
tion of the peer review process, the justification for preserving the
confidentiality of peer review committee documents and the justifica-
tions for allowing discovery of the documents produced by peer re-
view committees. The comment then focuses upon the Pennsylvania
approach to peer review as governed by the Pennsylvania Peer Re-
view Protection Act,11 and judicial interpretations of the Act. Fi-
nally, the author suggests possible directions courts should take in
establishing the Pennsylvania rule regarding peer review.
1 2
6. See generally PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY IN THE '80s, supra note 3 (The American
Medical Association (AMA) report hides the medical malpractice problem behind the euphe-
mism of professional liability and focuses its concerns not on negligent physicians but spiraling
insurance costs and litigation-prone plaintiffs' attorneys.).
7. As this relates to peer review, physicians would like to protect the proceedings of
such committees from discovery. See infra notes 66-76 and accompanying text.
8. See generally, THE AMA IS WRONG, supra note 3 (malpractice "crisis" is attribu-
table to excessive amount of medical negligence).
9. The conspiracy of silence has been defined as a refusal on the part of the medical
community to comment on the quality of care provided by individual physicians. This is partic-
ularly troublesome to plaintiffs' attorneys since it greatly decreases the ability of the bar to
obtain expert witnesses in medical malpractice actions. Lectures by Donald Farage, Esq., Civil
Trial Preparation and Techniques, Dickinson School of Law (Fall 1985). See also, Public
Policy v. The Protection of Peer Review, 53 U.M.K.C. L.R. 63, 74 (1984).
10. It has been argued that discoverability of peer review proceedings will allow the
resultant litigation to act as a check on malpractice as physicians are forced to provide better
care to avoid litigation. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
11. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 425 (Purdon 1985).
12. The issue of the discoverability of peer review committee documents is currently on
appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Sanderson v. Bryan, Doc. No. 236 HBG 86. This
case was argued before Judges Wickersham, Rowley and Tamilia on October 2, 1986.
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II. The Medical Malpractice Problem
It is generally agreed that a malpractice problem is plaguing
our nation's health care system."8 The difficulty, however, lies in pre-
cisely defining that problem. Various attempts at definition have
reached different conclusions. Most of these studies verify that doc-
tors' negligence is at the root of the problem.
A. The American Medical Association Approach
During the final months of 1984 and the initial months of 1985,
the American Medical Association Special Task Force on Profes-
sional Liability and Insurance published a series of three reports and
an action plan which addressed the issue of medical malpractice.14
Interestingly, the American Medical Association (AMA) chose to
define the problem as one of "professional liability" rather than
"malpractice."'1 5 The AMA Task Force identified two areas which
give rise to what they consider to be a "crisis" situation."6 The pri-
mary area of concern is the spiraling cost of liability insurance. A
secondary concern is the increasing prevalence of "defensive
medicine.' 1 7 The determination that negligent physicians may be a
cause of the "crisis" was conspicuously absent from the AMA's list
of factors giving rise to the malpractice problem.' 8
The AMA Task Force perceived the spiraling cost of liability
insurance as the greatest area of concern. The Task Force reports
noted that medical liability insurance premiums increased by more
than eighty percent during the eight year period between 1975 and
1983.19 In terms of financial impact, the rising costs have created a
13. The extent of the problem has been described in many ways, from a smoldering
issue, see, e.g., Derbyshire, Malpractice, Medical Discipline, and the Public, HOSPITAL PRAC-
TICE 209 (1984), to a full blown crisis, see, e.g., PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY IN THE '80S, supra
note 3, Report 1 (1984).
14. PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY IN THE '80s, supra note 3, at 1.
15. By defining its terms in this way, see PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY IN THE '80s, supra
note 3, Report I at 3, the AMA diverts attention from the connotations of negligence typically
associated with "malpractice." Instead, malpractice is cast as simply another cost of doing
business.
16. See Professional Liability in the 80's, supra note 3.
17. There appears to be no clear consensus on what is properly classified as "defensive
medicine." See THE AMA Is WRONG, supra note 3, at 4. Generally, however, defensive
medicine is classified as those procedures which are performed, not as an essential element of
quality care, but as a means to guard against future malpractice suits.
18. This omission is particularly conspicuous since the AMA report is replete with
charts and graphs which indicate that the number of malpractice claims has been steadily
rising. PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY IN THE '80's, supra note 3, report 1 at 13, 15.
19. PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY IN THE '80s, supra note 3, Report 1 at 8.
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situation more serious than the cost crisis of the 1970's.20 The Task
Force concluded that these rising costs are directly attributable to
the frequency and severity of indemnity payments." The AMA re-
port argued further that as physicians seek to decrease the costs as-
sociated with medical practice, they will be forced to increase the
costs to the patients.22
The AMA proposes a four-step plan to alleviate the perceived
crisis situation facing the nation's medical professionals. First, the
AMA Task Force calls for increased public education aimed at
showing the public how the "professional liability" problem affects
patients by raising health care costs and simultaneously decreasing
the availability of certain "high risk" services." Second, the Task
Force argues for reform of the tort system.a Third, it calls for the
creation of a national defense coordination system to provide physi-
cians with a source of information useful in defending lawsuits.' 5 Fi-
nally, the Task Force suggests that changes be made in the medical
profession's approach to risk control and quality review.' Interest-
ingly, the AMA Task Force's order of priorities relegates the review
of the quality of care to the bottom of the list. The conclusion that
can be drawn from the AMA reports and suggested courses of action
is that medical negligence is not a problem which requires immedi-
20. "This crisis [1984] is being caused by the same components that caused the mid
1970's crisis, only magnified ..... Id. at 14 (quoting Thomas P. Fox, Wisconsin Insurance
Commissioner). Charles P. Hall points out that the financial strains upon the medical profes-
sion cause crisis situations:.
[t]he first major concern has to do with the potential paralysis of the delivery of
medical services. This can be manifested dramatically, as it was during the
"work slowdown" (strike) carried out by members of the New York State Medi-
cal Society in several New York counties from June 1-10, 1975. In less dramatic
fashion, hospitals and physicians may, either individually or collectively, choose
to withhold certain types of service or treatment if they are perceived to involve
excessive potential for malpractice claims.
Hall, supra note 3, at 83.
21. PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY IN THE '80S, supra note 3, Report I at 6, 11.
22. "Ultimately it is the public who will pay the costs ... either through increases in
health care costs or by having their access to health care services limited because providers,
unable to pay the fees, withdraw from the market." Id. at 14 (quoting, Thomas P. Fox, Wis-
consin Insurance Commissioner).
23. American Medical Association, AMA SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON PROFESSIONAL LI-
ABILITY AND INSURANCE ACTION PLAN 3 (1985) [hereinafter cited as ACTION PLAN].
24. Id. at 5. These reforms are meant to accomplish four goals: 1) provide adequate
compensation for injuries arising from medical negligence; 2) efficiently resolve liability claims;
3) recognize a physician's unusual vulnerability from suits and hence provide protections; and
4) provide protection from meritless suits.
25. Id. at 8.
26. Id. at 8. Among the suggested reforms is improving the quality of peer review. Of
the seven suggested reforms, contained in the AMA's four-step plan only two deal directly
with the evaluation of medical care. The remaining reforms advocate information exchange
and statistical evaluations.
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ate attention.27 Since the AMA reports indicate a general increase in
the number of suits against physicians, it may be inferred that the
AMA Task Force concluded that addressing the review of patient
care is not crucial because current review processes are deemed
sufficient.
B. The Association of Trial Lawyers of America Approach
The Association of Trial Lawyers of America (ATLA)28 dis-
agrees with the medical community's inferences of adequate self-reg-
ulation. In a response to the AMA report on professional liability,
ATLA laid the blame for the malpractice crisis squarely on the
shoulders of the medical community." ATLA's initial response re-
futed physicians' claims that liability insurance costs are rising. The
trial lawyers argued that "[s]ince 1976, the cost of malpractice in-
surance has actually been steadily declining as a percentage of total
health care costs, until it now, at $1.5 billion in 1983, is less than
one-half of one percent of total health care costs ($355.4 billion)." 0
To further refute physician allegations of rising insurance costs, the
ATLA response to the AMA noted: "The average American physi-
cian spends only 2.9 percent of his or her gross income (currently
estimated around $200,000) on medical malpractice insurance. This
is just slightly more than the 2.3 percent spent on 'professional car
upkeep,' but, interestingly enough, well over the 1.2 percent spent on
continuing education.""1 Turning to the AMA's claims of the rising
costs of "defensive medicine," ATLA dismissed the claims out of
hand. ATLA points out that defensive medicine is really only care-
ful, quality medical care.8" According to ATLA, the cause of the
27. The AMA Task Force's conclusion could have been predicted based upon the ob-
servations of sociologist Elliot Freidson. Mr. Friedson notes that professionals make three
claims which distinguish themselves from other workers:
[fQirst of all, they claim to possess such an unusual degree of skill and knowledge
that non-professionals are not equipped to evaluate or regulate the members of
the profession. Secondly, they claim that the professional is responsible and can
be trusted to work conscientiously without the supervision that is necessary for
other types of workers. Thirdly, they claim that on the rare occasion when a
member is found to be incompetent or unethical, the profession itself can take
proper regulatory and disciplinary action, without outside interference.
Feinstein, Special Report: The Ethics of Professional Regulation, 312 NEW ENG. J. MED. 801
(1985) (citing E. FRIEDSON, PROFESSION OF MEDICINE: A STUDY OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF AP-
PLIED KNOWLEDGE 170 (1970)).
28. ATLA is a professional organization of attorneys who specialize in the area of
litigation.
29. See generally, THE AMA IS WRONG, supra note 3.
30. Id. at 2 (footnotes omitted).
31. Id. at 4 (footnotes omitted).
32. Id. at 5.
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medical malpractice problem is clearly medical negligence."3
With respect to future medical care, the ATLA response indi-
cated serious doubts about the efficacy of the AMA Action Plan pro-
posals. ATLA opined that the AMA proposals represent nothing
more than self-serving special interest legislation. 4 The proposals
are not even internally consistent. ATLA observed that the medical
profession seeks protection from tort liability through judicial recog-
nition of special privileges for physicians characterized by more
stringent negligence standards. Yet, it also observed that it is the
medical profession itself which defines the standard of care to which
physicians will be held.35
Unfortunately, the ATLA response to the AMA failed to make
positive suggestions for reforms which could lead to a more stable
medical community. ATLA declared the malpractice problem to be
solely a medical problem, in the same way that the AMA passes
responsibility for the malpractice problem to insurers and "ambu-
lance-chasing" attorneys.8 6
C. Public Perceptions
Although the views of the AMA and ATLA should be recog-
nized as self-serving expression of polar views,3 7 they are indispen-
sible in coming to grips with the problem of providing quality medi-
cal care. These views are particularly useful because they provide
insight into the perceptions from which the competing groups oper-
ate. An understanding of competing perceptions is crucial to reach-
ing an effective solution to the current crisis. Any effective solution
must incorporate elements of both views without alienating either
party. Before a solution may be fashioned, however, it is important
to examine other reasons for the existence of the current malpractice
crisis.
Numerous studies conclude that the potential pool of malprac-
tice claims is substantially greater than the number of claims actu-
33. Id. at 6.
34. Id. at 8 passim.
35. Id.
36. "Efforts directed toward tort reform and legislative relief must be reasonable and
not self-serving. Afalpractice is a medical problem, not a legal one, and those injured as a
result of negligence are entitled to fair and prompt compensation." Id. at II (emphasis added).
37. The fact that these views are diametrically opposed is not unexpected. The phe-
nomenon of reaching conclusions based upon identical facts is known as cognitive dissonance.
It is widely found in political relationships where the actors are operating from widely different
perspectives.
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ally submitted.a It is therefore very difficult to grasp the scope of
the malpractice problem accurately. Further clouding the issue is the
fact that there has been a "tremendous increase in the volume of
'illegitimate' claims in recent years, claims which allege malpractice
under circumstances which, by any reasonable definition, involve
neither negligence nor wrongdoing on the part of the provider."3 9 On
the basis of the above stated facts, two conclusions may be drawn.
First, the medical profession does have a negligence problem. Sec-
ond, attorneys are representing clients who should not be bringing
suit. Consequently, when examining the reasons for the increase in
both legitimate and illegitimate malpractice claims, it can be seen
that physicians, attorneys, and patients are all responsible for the
increase in the number of lawsuits that have been filed.
Moreover, patients now find it increasingly easier to sue their
physicians because personal relationships no longer create bonds be-
tween doctors and patients. The practice of medicine has become
highly specialized; the days of the family doctor have all but passed
into history. Today's physician is a highly-trained technician special-
izing in circumscribed areas of medical expertise. Consequently, few
individuals can develop the close personal relationships with their
physicians characteristic of earlier times. 0 In addition to the deterio-
rating doctor-patient relationships, patients have grown to expect
more from their physicians. With the widespread reporting of medi-
cal "miracles, '41 patients lose sight of the fact that medicine is still
an inexact science and come to expect miraculous cures for them-
selves.4 2 With daily news reports of artificial organs and miracle dis-
coveries, the individual patients grow to believe that physicians
should be able to restore them to perfect health.
Because they are not physicians themselves, many attorneys fos-
ter the same views about medical science as their clients. High qual-
38. See generally: REPORT OF THE SPECIAL ADVISORY PANEL ON MEDICAL MALPRAC-
TICE, State of New York (New York, NY, 1976) pp. 32-33; REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S
COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (DHEW Publications No. [OS] 73-89), Washington,
D.C. Government Printing Office, 1973, pp. 50-70.
39. Hall, supra note 3, at 84.
40. Id. at 86.
41. See, e.g., Medicine's New Triumphs: Birth, Surgery, Genes, Artificial Parts,
Drugs, Burns, the Brain. Radiology, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, November 11, 1985 at
46 et. seq.; Ubell, How Today's Surgeons Perform "The Impossible," PARADE, November 3,
1985 at 4 et. seq. These two articles are typical examples of those that spur heightened public
expectations.
42. "In no small part because of the widespread reporting of medical 'miracles,' many
people believe that the failure of the doctor to restore them to perfect health constitutes mal-
practice." Derbyshire, Malpractice, Medical Discipline, and the Public, HOSPITAL PRACTICE,
January 1984 at 220.
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ity medical care which produces less than perfect results is often
hastily labeled malpractice. As a result, many attorneys are too will-
ing to represent potential malpractice victims. It has been speculated
that market forces at work during the 1970's also contributed to the
willingness of the legal profession to litigate medical malpractice
cases.43 Interestingly the explosion of malpractice cases seems to par-
allel a reduction in automobile insurance litigation." Under this
view, as the latter became less profitable, attorneys shifted their case
loads to more lucrative areas of law.
A final factor contributing to the proliferation of medical mal-
practice claims is public perception of society as a whole. The mass
consumption society in which we live is capable of satiating a per-
son's wants and desires almost immediately. In addition to instant
satisfaction of his wants, a person is also confronted with a society
characterized by a large number of government entitlement pro-
grams. When these two societal elements combine, a situation results
which produces what one commentator calls a "philosophy of entitle-
ment."'45 Individuals who adopt this philosophy grow to expect enti-
tlement to flawless medical care. When such care is not received,
these individuals feel they have a right to sue their physician. Fur-
ther, the Medical Director of PHICO Insurance Company,'46 argues
that when persons believe they are entitled to sue their physicians,
they feel justified, in demanding excessively high settlement figures.
This is because insurance companies are increasingly being viewed
as mechanisms not to compensate victims for their injuries, but
mechanisms to redistribute wealth.' 7
D. Conclusions
Our inability to reach a solution to the medical malpractice
problems plaguing society is realistically understandable. Because
the parties involved view the problems from such widely different
perspectives, "solutions" which force a course of action upon the par-
ties, without considering how that action will be viewed, will not pro-
duce the desired outcomes. Instead continued resistance to change
43. "It has been speculated that trial lawyers who had their case loads adversely af-
fected by the growing adoption of no-fault insurance laws in the automobile insurance field
simply shifted their attention to malpractice." Hall, supra note 3, at 87.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 85.
46. PHICO is a medical liability company which insures doctors, hospitals, and medi-
cal schools around the country.
47. Telephone interview with Dr. Joseph A. Ricci, Medical Director, PHICO Insurance
Company (October 29, 1985).
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will result. An increased threat of litigation will only foster greater
animosity between the medical and legal communities because physi-
cians place the blame for the malpractice crisis upon the insurers
and the attorneys. On the other hand, the tort reforms proposed by
the AMA will not eliminate the cause of the problem. These reforms
will merely hide the problem from view. Obviously, physicians are
concerned with the economic impact of malpractice litigation. This
economic impact could be greatly reduced if the problem of negli-
gent doctors could be eliminated. The solution, therefore, must lie in
better policing the doctors' ranks without losing the existing threat
of litigation.
III. The Peer Review Process
Self regulation of the medical profession is primarily adminis-
tered through the peer review process. 8 Although the concept of
peer review has only recently been brought to public attention, the
AMA states that the concept of peer review is "as old as organized
medicine itself.""" Currently, peer review is mandated by the federal
government's Medicare and Medicaid programs.50 To qualify for re-
imbursement of funds expended to administer these federal pro-
grams, hospitals must meet the federally approved standards estab-
lished by the Joint Committee on Accreditation of Hospitals
(JCAH). 1 These standards govern peer review as well as all other
aspects of hospital operation. The ultimate goal of these standards,
as stated by the JCAH, is to "improve the quality of care and ser-
vices and the quality of the environment of care provided in health
care settings through the voluntary accreditation process."" 2 Al-
though the JCAH attempts to improve medical care by establishing
minimum standards of professionalism, the peer review process is the
primary mechanism available fc, r enforcing those standards in indi-
vidual hospitals.
The chief concern of the JCAH is that "the medical staff strives
48. See supra note 4.
49. Comment, Medical Peer Review Protection in the Health Care Industry, 52 TEMP.
L.Q. 552, 563 (1979) (quoting AMA, I PEER REVIEW MANUAL forward at 1 (1972)).
50. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395-1396 (West 1985).
51. The JCAH is a private organization founded by the American College of Physi-
cians, the American Hospital Association, and the American Medical Association. The Com-
mission functions as a non-profit organization and is meant to develop minimum standards to
insure quality medical care. Holbrook, Medical Malpractice Litigation: The Discoverability
and Use of Hospitals' Quality Assurance Committee Records, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 54, 57
(1976).
52. JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS, 1985 ACCREDITATION
MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS iii (1984) [hereinafter cited as JCAH MANUAL].
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to assure the provision of high-quality patient care through the mon-
itoring and evaluation of the quality and appropriateness of patient
care."58 Typically, this goals is achieved through the use of a com-
mittee that is charged with "monitoring and evaluation of the qual-
ity and appropriateness of patient care by all individuals with
clinical privileges."' 54 This committee is most commonly referred to
as an Executive Committee and is generally comprised of the chiefs
of clinical departments and physicians elected for membership by
the entire staff.55 As the major quality control mechanism, the Exec-
utive Committee is responsible for developing and enforcing stan-
dards of medical care. 6 Additionally, the committee is responsible
for coordination of the hospital's overall quality assurance pro-
gram.' Thus, it is responsible for overseeing the activities of other
review committees acting within the hospital."
Another important committee within the framework of the hos-
pital's peer review process is the Credentials Committee. As its name
implies, this committee is responsible for evaluating the credentials
of physicians applying for hospital staff privileges. Subsequent to this
review, completed evaluations are forwarded to the Executive Com-
mittee. After review of the Credentials Committee's recommenda-
tions, it is incumbent upon the Executive Committee to determine
who should be granted staff privileges."
The Utilization Review Committee is another committee crucial
to the review process. Although this committee is described as a
committee needed for JCAH accreditation, it is also required by the
federal government regulations. 0 The purpose of the committee is to
insure that hospital facilities are not being utilized unnecessarily. In
the words of the JCAH, "[t]he utilization review program shall en-
deavor to provide high quality patient care in the most cost effective
manner." 61
53. Id. at 84.
54. Id.
55. Hall, Hospital Committee Proceedings and Reports: Their Legal Status, I Am.
J.L. MED. 245, 248 (1975).
56. Holbrook, supra note 51, at 59.
57. This responsibility arises because the Executive Committee collects and analyzes
the reports developed by other peer review committees.
58. JCAH MANUAL, supra note 52, at 151.
59. Holbrook, supra note 51, at 60.
60. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395x(k) (West 1983).
61. JCAH MANUAL, supra note 52, at 197. The mandates require that this review
examine all means of utilization of resources - underutilization, overutilization, and ineffi-
cient scheduling. Interestingly, if this committee is effective, it should be able to prevent the
occurrence of "defensive medicine" since "defensive medicine" is technically defined as an
overutilization of a hospital's resources.
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The final committee,62 which is important to insuring quality
hospital care, is the Medical Audit Committee.6 a This committee is
primarily responsible for evaluating the care provided by individual
physicians. It seeks to evaluate the physician's application of medical
knowledge in relation to the current state of the art.6' Since direct
observation of the physician is impossible, the committee must
achieve its goals by evaluating the medical records of individual
patients.65
The records produced by these committees can be vital weapons
in the litigation process because the committees are directly respon-
sible for evaluating the quality of a physician's care in a given situa-
tion. The medical community believes that these records should be
protected from discovery. Attorneys, on the other hand, are anxious
to discover the findings and conclusions of review committees. All
fifty states and the District of Columbia have now enacted legisla-
tion that restricts the discoverability of peer review proceedings. De-
spite this legislative action, judicial opinions have, in many instances,
eroded the protections provided by the legislatures.
A. Arguments in Support of Protection
Medical professionals have clearly stated their desire to have
the records of peer review committees remain privileged from discov-
ery. Various reasons are advanced to support this position. Probably
the most frequently cited reason for preserving confidentiality is to
foster frank and open discussion with no fear of legal reprisals. 66
Other arguments can be advanced to support confidentiality of peer
review proceedings. For example, medical review must occur on an
individual case basis and discovery of peer review documents relating
to previous investigations will allow incorrect conclusions to be
drawn about the care administered in the matter subject to litiga-
62. The reader should be aware that the committees discussed in this comment are not
the only committees which conduct peer review. Individual hospitals are free to conduct other
types of peer review which their bylaws may dictate.
63. It has been suggested that this is the committee most feared by physicians since it




66. This view was most persuasively argued in Bredice v. Doctors Hospital, 50 F.R.D.
249 (D.C. 1970). The court concluded that confidentiality was essential to the effective opera-
tion of peer review committees. See infra note 71 and accompanying text. Since publication of
the Bredice opinion, it has been cited in numerous cases and articles arguing for the protection
of peer review committee documents. See also infra note 70-74 and accompanying text.
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tion.6 7 Medical professionals are the only ones qualified to ade-
quately judge their peers. 8 Finally, confidentiality would prevent
plaintiffs from engaging in "fishing expeditions" to find a theory
upon which they can base liability of the physician.6 9
Given the medical community opinion that it can effectively po-
lice itself, it is not surprising that physicians generally believe there
is no need for outsiders-especially attorneys, who are viewed as ad-
versaries-to intrude into the peer review process. The medical com-
munity asserts that this intrusion will discourage open and frank dis-
cussion among committee members.7 0 The possible chilling effect of
discoverability upon peer review could manifest itself in two ways.
First, permitting discovery will directly reduce institutional and indi-
vidual self analysis.71 Second, discoverability would make it more
difficult for the review committee to encourage witnesses to come
forward with testimony.7 2 This latter view is particularly persuasive
when viewed from the economic perspective of doctors. One com-
mentator notes:
[i]n a disturbing number of cases, whether or not any action was
taken against the offending doctor, the physicians doing the crit-
67. See infra note 75 and accompanying text.
68. See infra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
69. See infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
70. See, Owens, Peer Review: Is Testifying Worth the Hassle, MED. ECON., August
20, 1984, at 167: Owens, Peer Reviewers are Ready to Sell Your Track Record, MED. ECON.,
June II, 1984 at 39.
71. Comment, Public Policy v. Peer Review Protection, 53 U.M.K.C. L.R. 63, 74
(1984). The incentives to provide full and complete disclosure of facts relevant to effective
review are greatly diminished if it is perceived that anything produced before the committee
will subsequently be used to establish liability in a malpractice action. This view was persua-
sively argued by District Judge Corcoran in Bredice v. Doctors Hospital:
[c]onfidentiality is essential to effective functioning of these staff meetings; and
these meetings are essential to the continued improvement in the care and treat-
ment of patients. Candid and conscientious evaluation of clinical practices is sine
qua non of adequate hospital care. To subject these discussions and deliberations
to the discovery process, without a showing of exceptional necessity, would result
in terminating such deliberations. Constructive professional criticism cannot oc-
cur in an atmosphere of apprehension that one doctor's suggestion will be used
as a denunciation of a colleague's conduct in a malpractice suit.The purpose of
these staff meetings is the improvement, through self-analysis, of the efficiency
of medical procedures and techniques. They are not a part of current patient
care but are in the nature of a retrospective review of the effectiveness of certain
medical procedures. The value of these discussions and reviews in the education
of the doctors who participate, and the medical students who sit in, is undenia-
ble. This value would be destroyed if the meetings and names of those partici-
pating were to be opened to the discovery process.
Bredice, 50 F.R.D. at 250.
72. Comment, Public Policy v. Peer Review Protection, 53 U.M.K.C. L.R. 63, 74
(1984). (Referencing Relator's Brief, State ex. rel. Chandra v. Sprinkle, No. 65400 at 21
(Mo. 1984)).
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icizing also suffered adverse effects-sometimes finding them-
selves on the wrong side of law suits. Many say they lost refer-
rals and had to endure the hostility of colleagues in addition to
the wrath of the accused. 3
With findings such as these, it is not surprising that physicians are
reluctant to appear before peer review committees as witnesses.74
Reluctance to testify can also be related to the view that each
incident of alleged malpractice is unique and must be treated as
such. "In most cases, there are several choices of treatment availa-
ble, and therefore for one doctor, with the benefit of hindsight, to
brand the work of another as malpractice is beyond the pale of good
conscience."'7 5 It cannot be said that following one course of action
rather than another is necessarily negligence. Each individual case of
patient care involves several acceptable alternatives. Consequently, if
information revealed in peer review proceedings is discoverable, ar-
guably, attorneys will not properly interpret those documents. Medi-
cal professionals fear that prior reviews of a physician's ability will
be used to create a presumption of guilt.
The objective analysis of individual cases is also a ground for
protecting peer review proceedings from discovery. Physicians argue
that non-physicians do not possess the expertise to objectively and
accurately review the quality of care rendered in a given case be-
cause medicine is a highly technical and complex profession. Since
objective evaluation of patient care is the purpose of peer review, 76
peer review committees should be allowed to proceed without fear of
outside interference.
A final justification for protecting peer review materials from
discovery is that protection will prevent the filing of nuisance suits. If
discovery is allowed, plaintiffs without meritorious cases would have
an incentive to file suit in hopes of discovering a cause of action hid-
den within the documents produced by a peer review committee. If
plaintiffs had the ability to find liability based upon peer review com-
mittee documents, the incentive to conduct prompt review of patient
treatment would be eliminated. Peer review committees would sim-
ply avoid conducting evaluations until they were sure their reports
73. Owens, Peer Review: Is Testifying Worth the Hassle, MED. ECON., August 20,
1984 at 167.
74. This reluctance to testify is often termed the "conspiracy of silence." See generally,
Kelner, The Medical Conspiracy of Silence, CASE & COM., July-August 1982, at 10.
75. Hirsh, Medical Professional Liability, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE - THE ATL SEMI-
NAR (1966).
76. See 158 PA. LEGIS. J., H.B. 1729 (daily ed. May 7, 1974) (statement of Rep.
McClatchy).
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could not be used to fuel the filing of meritless suits.
B. Arguments in Support of Discovery
Just as the medical profession has called for protection of peer
review proceedings, the plaintiffs' bar has called for discoverability
of peer review proceedings. Arguments for discovery usually proceed
on two grounds. First, any chilling effect produced by discovery
would be inconsequential because inherent in the system are mecha-
nisms which provide incentives to conduct peer review." Second,
fundamental concepts of discovery require that the documents pro-
duced through peer review be discoverable. 78 The argument notes
that there is no common law privilege for peer review documents and
one should only be created in extreme circumstances. A final argu-
ment which has sometimes been advanced is that an increased threat
of litigation will actually decrease the incidence of malpractice.79
Interestingly, arguments that claim discoverability produces no
chilling effect focus on the integrity of the medical profession. Most
commonly, the emphasis is on the "conspiracy of silence."8 If a
"conspiracy of silence" does in fact exist, extending a privilege to
peer review proceedings will only legitimize the conspiracy. Once le-
gitimized, plaintiffs will be unable to see that justice is served by
receiving compensation for negligently inflicted injuries.
It is argued that hospitals have a dual incentive to see that peer
review is effectively conducted regardless of the discoverability of
peer review proceedings. First, peer review is a requirement for
JCAH accreditation. This accreditation carries a great deal of pres-
tige, and hospitals will not be willing to jeopardize their standing in
the community by losing their JCAH accreditation." Second, hospi-
tals cannot afford to reduce the amount or quality of peer review.
Current peer review practices occur at such minimal levels that peer
77. See infra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
78. See infra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
79. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
80. See, e.g., Goldberg, The Peer Review Privilege: A Law in Search of a Valid Policy,
10 AM. J.L. MED. 151 (1985). The author reasons:
[tlo say that a physician ...will not stand by his professional opinion of a
colleague's action in the event of subsequent litigation unless he is guaranteed
anonymity and immunity is to say, in effect, that physicians are unwilling or
unable to police their own ranks - or that the universally denied "conspiracy of
silence" in fact exists.
Id. at 160, n.48 (quoting Dunn, Peer Review: A Secret Affair?, 31 TRUSTEE 10 (1978)).
81. Holbrook, supra note 51, at 60. Further, loss of JCAH accreditation would mean a
loss of federal funds to reimburse expenses incurred while caring for Medicare and Medicaid
patients. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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review is often more form than substance.8 A further reduction in
peer review might expose the hospital to excessive potential
liability.83
A second ground for permitting discovery of the documents pro-
duced during peer review is based upon modern litigation theory.
The scope of allowable discovery has broadened as rules of pleading
have been liberalized.8 4 The broadening of discovery rules is impor-
tant because "discovery, the process which enables the parties to find
evidence under the control of adverse parties, blunts the rough edge
of the adversary system which approves a party's concealment of
awkward facts." 80 Since discovery is so important to trial prepara-
tion, privileges should be granted only in rare and compelling cir-
cumstances.86 The circumstances surrounding peer review are not
compelling enough to justify protection since plaintiffs could be com-
pletely precluded from proving their case should discovery be
disallowed.87
The final argument is that an increased threat of litigation sup-
ports the public policy of insuring quality medical care. To avoid
involvement in a malpractice suit, physicians will exercise greater
82. Comment, Public Policy v. Peer Review Protection, 53 U.M.K.C. L.R. 63, 74
(1984). This argument infers that physicians conduct review procedures perfunctorily in an
effort to comply with regulations. Thus, emphasis is not placed on determining whether a phy-
sician subject to evaluation is qualified to practice medicine.
83. Id. at 75. See Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp. 33 1ll.2d 326,
211 N.E.2d 253, cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966) (hospitals are liable for failure to engage in
effective quality control).
84. See PA.R.C.P. No. 4003.1 which provides:
... a party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged,
which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it
relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or
defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, consent,
custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things
and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable
matter. It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inad-
missible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
85. Goldberg, supra note 80, at 160.
86. Prof. Wigmore suggests a four part test to determine whether a privilege should be
granted:
(1) [f]irst, the communication must be intended to be confidential. But it is not
merely the confidentiality of a communication that deserves protection. The fur-
ther basis must be some extrinsic policy of protecting from injury some impor-
tant social relation, even though at the expense of an incidental obstruction to
the investigation of facts. Therefore, the further conditions of such a privilege
are (2) a relation to which confidentiality of communications is essential; (3) and
a relation which in public opinion merits careful conservation; and (4) an injury
to the relation, by disclosure of confidences greater than the injury to justice by
withholding them.
J. WIGMORE, A STUDENT'S TEXTBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 386 (1935).
87. Goldberg, supra note 80, at 161.
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care in treating their patients.88 Thus, the fear of legal proceedings
acts as a mechanism to improve the quality of treatment.89
IV. The Pennsylvania Approach to Peer Review Protection
The Pennsylvania legislature protected peer review proceedings
from litigious attack in order to foster honest and critical review of
health care. This protection came in the form of legislation entitled
the Pennsylvania Peer Review Protection Act (PPRPA)."' The
PPRPA affords two types of protection to the medical community.
First, the Act provides that members of the medical community act-
ing in furtherance of a peer review committee's goals are immune
from penalties for statements made to the committee.9' Second, the
Act protects documents produced by peer review committees from
discoverability and admissibility in any civil actions based upon the
subject matter of the review committee's work.92 Apparently, the
legislature felt that the best way to foster quality health care was to
allow medical professionals to review the work of their peers without
outside interference. 93
A. An Examination of the PPRPA
The first type of protection afforded by the PPRPA is immunity
from liability, granted by section 425.3 of the Act.' 4 The legislature
88. THE INFLUENCE OF LITIGATION ON MEDICAL PRACTICE 45 (C. Wood ed. 1977).
89. Observation seems to confirm that litigation does increase physician accountability
for malpractice. One commentator notes that "[als a result of the continuing malpractice cri-
sis, plaintiffs' attorneys are uncovering an increasing number of incompetent, negligent physi-
cians." Derbyshire, Medical Discipline in Disarray Retrospective and Prospective, Hosp.
PRACT., June 1984, at 136 D.
90. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 425 (Purdon 1985).
91. See infra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
92. See infra notes 100-109 and accompanying text.
93. This legislative intent can also be seen in the official title of the PPRPA which
describes the Act as "[a]n Act providing for the increased use of peer review groups by giving
protection to individuals and data who report to any review group." 158 PA. LEGIS. J., H.B.
1729 (daily ed. May 7, 1974) (emphasis added).
94. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 425.3 states:
(a) [n]otwithstanding any other provision of the law, no person providing
information to any review organization shall be held, by reason of having pro-
vided such information, to have violated any criminal law, or to be civilly liable
under any law, unless:
(I) such information is unrelated to the performance of the duties and func-
tions of such review organization, or
(2) such information is false and the person providing such information
knew, or had reason to believe, that such information was false.
(b)(I) No individual who, as a member or employee of any review organi-
zation or who furnishes professional counsel or services to such organization,
shall be held by reason of the performance by him of any duty, function, or
activity authorized or required of review organizations, to have violated any
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evidenced its intent to provide broad protection by explicitly identify-
ing a broad class of persons to whom immunity should extend. The
first group upon which immunity is conferred is composed of persons
"providing information to any review committee." 5 Committee wit-
nesses can lose their immunity, however, if the information which
they produce is: 1) unrelated to the function of the review commit-
tee, or 2) false and the person providing the testimony knew, or had
reason to know that the testimony was false." The second group
upon which immunity is conferred is composed of members or em-
ployees of the peer review committee. 97 The immunity granted to
members of the review committee cannot be lost unless the testi-
mony given was motivated by malice."8 It should be noted that the
immunities conferred by the legislature extend to both civil and
criminal actions. Thus, the section grants all persons appearing in
the peer review process some form of immunity from prosecution for
their statements."
Section 425.4 of the PPRPA also protects the operation of peer
review committees. This section protects "the proceedings and
records" of a "review committee" from "discovery or introduction
into evidence." 100 This protection is specifically limited to "any civil
criminal law, or to be civilly liable under any law, provided he has exercised due
care.
(2) The provisions of paragraph (1) of this subsection shall not apply with
respect to any action taken by any individual if such individual, in taking such
action, was motivated by malice toward any person affected by such action.
95. Id. at § 425.3(a).
96. Id. at §§ 425.3(a)(1), 425.3(a)(2).
97. Id. at § 425.3(b)(1).
98. Id. at § 425.3(b)(2).
99. See generally, Comment, Medical Peer Review Protection in the Health Care In-
dustry, 52 TEMP. L.Q. 553 (1979), for a more complete discussion of the immunity provisions
of the PPRPA.
100. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 425.4 provides:
The proceedings and records of a review committee shall be held in confi-
dence and shall not be subject to discovery or introduction into evidence in any
civil action against a professional health care provider arising out of the matters
which are the subject of evaluation and review by such committee and no person
who was in attendance at a meeting of such committee shall be permitted or
required to testify in any such civil action as to any evidence or other matters
produced or presented during the proceedings of such committee or as to any
findings, recommendations, evaluations, opinions or other actions of such com-
mittee or any members thereof: Provided, however, That information, documents
or records otherwise available from original sources are not to be construed as
immune from discovery or use in any such civil action merely because they were
presented during proceedings of such committee, nor should any person who tes-
tifies before such committee or who is a member of such committee be prevented
from testifying as to matters within his knowledge, but the said witness cannot
be asked about his testimony before such a committee or opinions formed by him
as a result of said committee hearings.
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action against a professional health care provider arising out of the
matters which are the subject of evaluation and review by such com-
mittee." 10' Further protection of the sanctity of the peer review pro-
cess is provided by prohibiting the introduction of the testimony of
witnesses or other participants in the peer review process into evi-
dence in any civil action." 2 Although the protections afforded by
section 425.4 of the PPRPA are broad, they are circumscribed in
such a way as to protect the ability of plaintiffs to prosecute a medi-
cal malpractice suit. The PPRPA specifically exempts "information,
documents, or records otherwise available from other sources."103
To more fully understand the operation of section 425.4 of the
PPRPA, it is necessary to examine the legislative definition of terms
used in the Act. The broad protections afforded by section 425.4 are
directed toward documents of "review committees.' 0 4 These com-
mittees are defined in section 425.2 of the Act as "any committee
engaging in peer review . . . to gather and review information relat-
ing to the care and treatment of patients."108 Further clarification of
the intended interpretation of the PPRPA is found in the definition
of peer review. Peer review is broadly defined as "the procedure for
evaluation by professional health care providers of quality and effi-
ciency of services ordered or performed by other professional health
101. Id. Interpretation of this phrase is directly responsible for the split in the interpre-
tation of the PPRPA by the Pennsylvania courts. See infra notes 131-37 and accompanying
text.
102. Id.
103. Id. This exemption is evidence that the legislature believes that malpractice actions
should be treated as individual occurrences. Evaluation of these records by a peer review com-
mittee will not preclude a plaintiff from obtaining the evidence necessary to prove his case
because a patient can discover his own medical records. Since malpractice actions are based
upon the care given to the individual plaintiff, § 425.4 of the PPRPA will not preclude such
actions.
104. See supra note 100.
105. More specifically, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 425.2 (Purdon 1985) states:
"[r]eview organization" means any committee engaging in peer review, in-
cluding a hospital utilization review committee,a hospital tissue committee, a
health insurance review committee, a hospital plan corporation review commit-
tee, a professional health service plan review committee, a dental review commit-
tee, a physicians' advisory committee, a nursing advisory committee, any com-
mittee established pursuant to the medical assistance program, and any
committee established by one or more State or local professional societies, to
gather and review information relating to the care and treatment of patients for
the purposes of (i) evaluating and improving the quality of health care rendered;
(ii) reducing morbidity or mortality; or (iii) establishing and enforcing guide-
lines designed to keep within reasonable bounds the cost of health care. It shall
also mean any hospital board, committee or individual reviewing the professional
qualifications or activities of its medical staff or applicants for admission thereto.
It shall also mean a committee of an association of professional health care prov-
iders reviewing the operation of hospitals, nursing homes, convalescent homes or
other health care facilities.
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care providers. ' 106 Finally, professional health care providers are de-
fined as "individuals or organizations who are approved, licensed, or
otherwise regulated to practice or operate in the health care field
under the laws of Pennsylvania. 10 7 Applying these definitions to sec-
tion 425.4 of the PPRPA, the statute can be paraphrased as follows:
the proceedings and records of any committee comprised of individu-
als or organizations approved, licensed, or regulated to practice in
the health care fields engaged in the evaluation of the quality and
efficiency of services provided by health care professionals shall be
held in confidence and shall not be subject to discovery of introduc-
tion into evidence. Obviously, protections granted to peer review or-
ganizations should be interpreted broadly since the records of any
committee concerned with the evaluation of health care are
protected.
The conclusion that broad protections are granted by section
425.4 of the PPRPA is supported by the plain words of the statute.
The words chosen by the legislature, however, do not always control
in questions of statutory interpretation.108 Instead, the object of stat-
utory interpretation is to ascertain the legislative intent behind the
enactment of the statute in question. One means available to statu-
tory analysts involves examination of the comments entered into the
legislative journals of the governmental body enacting the legislation.
In the case of PPRPA, a floor debate occurred prior to adoption of
106. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 425.2 (Purdon 1985) provides:
"[pleer review" means the procedure for evaluation by professional health
care providers of the quality and efficiency of services ordered or performed by
other professional health care providers, including practice analysis, inpatient
hospital and extended care facility utilization review, medical audit, ambulatory
care review, claims review, and the compliance of a hospital, nursing home or
convalescent home or other health care facility operated by a professional health
care provider with the standards set by an association of health care providers
and with applicable laws, rules, and regulations.
107. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 425.2 (Purdon 1985) states:
"[pirofessional health care provider" means individuals or organizations
who are approved, licensed or otherwise regulated to practice or operate in the
health care field under the laws of the Commonwealth, including, but not limited
to, the following individuals or organizations:
(I) A physician.(2) A dentist.(3) A podiatrist.(4) A chiropractor.(5) An
optometrist.(6) A psychologist.(7) A pharmacist.(8) A registered or prac-
tical nurse.(9) A physical therapist.(10) An administrator of a hospital, a
nursing or convalescent home, or other health care facility.(l I) A corpo-
ration or other organization operating a hospital, a nursing or convales-
cent home or other health care facility.
108. "The object of all interpretation and construction of laws is to ascertain and effec-
tuate the intention of the legislature." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 551. See Girard Trust Co. v.
City of Philadelphia, 369 Pa. 499, 87 A.2d 277 (1952) (the reason of the law should prevail
over its letter); Null v. Staiger, 333 Pa. 370, 4 A.2d 883 (1939) (provision of statute must be
construed with reference to the object intended to be accomplished by it).
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the statute by the Pennsylvania House of Representatives. During
the debate, Mr. Wells, a sponsor of the PPRPA, was called upon to
explain the purpose behind the legislation. Explaining the intent of
section 425.4's confidentiality provisions, Mr. Wells paraphrased the
section, stating:
[a]ll data and information acquired by a review organization, in
the exercise of its duties and functions, shall be held in confi-
dence and shall not be disclosed to any person except to the
extent that may be necessary to carry out the purpose of the
review organization and shall not be admissible as evidence in
any other civil proceedings.19
Arguably, Mr. Wells' comments indicate that the legislature in-
tended to provide complete protection to all data acquired during the
peer review process. Thus, coupling the clear meaning of the PPRPA
language with the legislative intent, there can be little doubt that the
Pennsylvania legislature desired to foster increased use of peer re-
view by conferring the broadest possible protection to peer review
proceedings.
B. Judicial Interpretation of the PPRPA
Pennsylvania courts have been presented with seven opportuni-
ties to apply the PPRPA to unique fact situations. Despite the
PPRPA's apparently clear meaning, the courts have not reached a
uniform conclusion about the protections afforded by section 425.4
of the Act. Four courts have precluded discovery of peer review doc-
uments based upon interpretations of the PPRPA."10 In direct oppo-
sition to this interpretation, however, three courts have concluded
that discovery should be restricted only to matters concerning the
facts giving rise to the instant litigation."'
1. Cases Supporting Protection
Schwartz v. Tri-County Hospital"2 presented the first opportu-
nity for interpretation of the PPRPA. The plaintiff brought a wrong-
ful death and survival action alleging negligent medical treatment as
the cause of the decedent's death. In an effort to prepare the case for
trial, the plaintiff served interrogatories upon the three defendant
109. 158 PA. LEGIS. J., H.B. 1729 (daily ed. May 7, 1974) (statement of Rep. Wells)
(emphasis added).
110. See infra notes 112-30 and accompanying text.
Ill. See infra notes 131-43 and accompanying text.
112. 74 Pa. D & C.2d 52 (C.P. Philadelphia Co. 1975).
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physicians. The interrogatories requested information "concerning
appearances by Dr. Rosner, or others, before any medical commit-
tees, official boards of medical associations, or other like review
groups, with regard to the actions taken by Dr. Rosner or others in
treating decedent." ' 1 3 Dr. Rosner and his co-defendants refused to
answer the interrogatories on the ground that the information sought
was protected from discovery pursuant to section 425.4 of the
PPRPA. 11 4 The court agreed with Dr. Rosner and sustained the phy-
sician's objections to the interrogatories.1 6 The court did not, how-
ever, discuss the exact nature of the documents sought in the discov-
ery request. Thus, it is not clear whether the plaintiff could have
obtained a different result by a more careful wording of the ques-
tioned interrogatories.116
Holiday v. Klimowski1 presented the second opportunity for
courts to apply the PPRPA. In that suit, the plaintiff alleged that
the hospital was negligent in permitting the defendant, Dr. Klimow-
ski, to perform abdominal surgery on him.1" ' The plaintiff sought to
discover "internal hospital records dealing with the review of their
case by the medical staff and various committees of the hospital." '
The hospital responded by seeking a protective order.120 The court
concluded that a protective order sought prior to passage of the
113. Id. at 53.
114. Id.
115. Id. The court reached its conclusion by noting:
[tlhe clear intent of the Peer Review Protection Act is to foster the greatest
candor and frank discussion at such review meetings. The Act is prospective in
its operation, but it is mandatory in its proscription of discovery. Hence, any
discovery sought after the Act takes effect is barred.
Id. at 54.
116. One commentator notes:
[miore specificity as to the information sought might have resulted in a different
outcome in Schwartz. Thus, if the information sought originated in the defend-
ant outside of the review organization or if the information sought was about the
appearances rather than about the proceedings, the information may have been
discoverable.
Comment, Medical Peer Review Protection in the Health Care Industry, 42 TEMP. L. Q. 553,
585 (1979). See Serafin v. Peoples Community Hosp. Auth., 67 Mich. App. 560, 242 N.W.2d
438 (1976) (circumstances surrounding peer review of defendant's patient not privileged).
117. 75 Pa. D.& C.2d 408 (C.P. Washington Co. 1976).
118. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the hospital was negligent in allowing
Klimowski to operate when he lacked the training, skill, and expertise to do so and in not
requiring Klimowski to use properly trained surgical assistance. Id. at 409.
119. Id.
120. The protection was sought on public policy grounds. Specifically, the hospital ar-
gued discovery would defeat the purposes of peer review and would consequently be detrimen-
tal to the public. Id. at 41 I. See also, Hallowell v. Jove, 247 Ga. 678, 279 S.E.2d 430 (1981)
(protection is necessary to support the underlying purpose behind legislation designed to pro-
tect peer review).
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PPRPA was denied for reasons which continued to be persuasive."'
Consequently, the court compelled the discovery of all requested
documents except those of the Utilization Review Committee. The
court concluded that the Utilization Review Committee proceedings
were specifically protected from discovery by section 425.4 of the
PPRPA.
122
It appears that this court may have misconstrued the meaning
of the PPRPA. The court allowed discovery of: 1) recommendations
made to the Board of Trustees regarding the application of Dr.
Klimowski; 2) records of the Board of Trustees relating to the
board's consideration of the Klimowski application; 3) written
charges filed against Klimowski with the hospital staff; and 4) min-
utes of the meetings of the hospital's surgical or medical staff as
those minutes related to Dr. Klimowski's professional conduct.1 23 All
of the granted discovery requests fell under the protection of the
PPRPA. This information is of and concerning the professional qual-
ifications of the defendant and, as such, is specifically protected by
the PPRPA.12'
The medical ability of Dr. Klimowski was again before the
courts in Bandes v. Klimowski. 25 There, during depositions a hospi-
tal administrator was asked, "[h]as there ever been any infraction of
the rules concerning Dr. Klimowski other than the late reporting of
hospital records?"1 2 6 The court ruled that the hospital administrator
did not need to answer the question because "such an inquiry is ex-
actly the type which the statute [PPRPA] is designed to protect. 1 7
This opinion, unfortunately, is too broad to be of guidance. If the
121. See Petrusky v. Charleroi Monessen Hosp., No. 367, slip op., (Pa. C.P. Washington
Co., May 14, 1974). The Petrusky court concluded:
We are going to allow the discovery because to refuse it would be to tell the
plaintiff that he may not even try to prove that the hospital staff, including the
defendant dentists, engaged in either an actually deceitful, a merely willful, or
an inexplicably negligent review of the case. It may turn out that some of the
matters are too privileged within the processes of the hospital and organized
medicine itself to wave around in the courtroom. They do not, however, seem to
us too privileged to be inquired into at private deposition, the record of which we
can always seal, if it becomes necessary.
Id. at 3 (emphasis in original).
122. Holiday at 411.
123. Id. at 409-10.
124. This type of information is defined as the type of information which peer review
committees are to collect. Since a hospital board collecting this information meets the defini-
tion of a "review committee," the documents requested from the trustees should have received
protection from discovery. Likewise, the minutes of staff committees should have been given
protection. See supra notes 100-09 and accompanying text.
125. Pa. D.& C. 3d II (C.P. Fayette Co. 1977).
126. Id. at 15-16.
127. Id. at 16.
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complaints sought were not produced through the peer review pro-
cess, they would not come within the protections of the PPRPA.
Hence, they would be discoverable.
The most recent decision precluding discovery of peer review
proceedings is Obenski v. Brooks,'28 a medical malpractice action.
This opinion is the least helpful in ascertaining the scope of the pro-
tections afforded by the PPRPA. The plaintiff sought to discover in-
formation relating to the defendant-physician's application for hospi-
tal staff privileges. The court noted that "if direct questioning of the
defendant concerning these questions was to be prohibited, it would
probably effectively foreclose plaintiffs from investigating this
area."' 12 9 Despite this observation, the court concluded that the
PPRPA precluded discovery.13 0 The court did not specifically state
what documents were protected. Instead, the court simply stated dis-
covery was precluded in the areas protected by the PPRPA.
2. Cases Permitting Discovery
The first departure from protecting peer review documents oc-
curred in Bolton v. Holy Spirit Hospital.'3' The court sought to de-
termine if section 425.4 of the PPRPA precluded discovery of docu-
ments relating to prior complaints, corrective actions taken by the
hospital against the defendant physicians, and personnel files. The
court focused on the limiting language found in section 425.4 of the
PPRPA in search of the answer. 132 Specifically, the court interpreted
the language to mean that section 425.4 limits the "privilege to those
peer review matters which also gave rise to the civil action."'133 Thus,
128. Pa. D.& C.3d 253 (C.P. Philadelphia Co. 1978).
129. Id. at 264.
130. The court stated:
[d]ue to the Act, plaintiffs cannot go directly to the relevant association or hos-
pital to explain the information they seek to discover which would be within
their knowledge. This leaves defendant [sic] as the only practical source for such
information. Discovery in this area must, however, exclude inquiries into areas
that are immune to discovery by virtue of the Peer Review Protection Act.
Id. See also Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217 (1984) (recognizing legislative enactments must be
given support over policy favored by the courts).
131. 105 Dauphin Co. Rep. 40 (C.P. Pa. 1984).
132. The court was concerned with the effect of the phrase "arising out of the matters
which are the subject of evaluation and review by such committees." Id. at 42.
133. Bolton, 105 Dauph. Co. Rep. at 45. This holding was harmonized with the concept
of liberal discovery by concluding "the legislature intended to balance the competing interests
of a litigant's right to evidence relevant to his claim against the need for full and frank discus-
sions during peer review meetings by providing a privilege but limiting that privilege to matter
that was the subject of the civil action." Id. at 45. See Segal v. Roberts, 380 So.2d 1049
(1979) (reaching a similar result), but see Hallowell v. Jove, 247 Ga. 678, 279 S.E.2d 430
(1981) (reaching the contrary result).
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the court concluded that documents produced at other hospitals were
subject to discovery.1"" Additionally, the court concluded that peer
review concerning patients other than the plaintiff were discovera-
ble.135 Consequently, the court greatly limited the protection af-
forded by the PPRPA.
The limits placed upon the PPRPA by Bolton were clearly not
intended by the Pennsylvania legislature. The intent of the legisla-
ture was to "provide for the increased use of peer review groups by
giving protection to individuals and data who report to any review
group."'u The Bolton decision defeats this goal because all peer re-
view data, except conclusions drawn about the plaintiff's case, are
discoverable. The individual plaintiff's hospital records are specifi-
cally exempted from the Act's protection.137 If Bolton is correct, the
only result achieved by the PPRPA is to protect from discovery con-
clusions about the quality of the plaintiff's care. This in fact provides
no protection since conclusions about the care administered to the
plaintiff will be provided by the plaintiff's experts.
Sanderson v. Bryan'3 8 offered the same conclusion as Bolton.
The defendant-physician sought a protective order from the court to
preclude discovery of all documents, produced by a review commit-
tee, which did not relate to the plaintiff's care. 3 9 Noting that the
discovery requests met the Bolton criteria, the court permitted dis-
covery to proceed." 0 In doing so, the court found the Bolton reason-
ing persuasive. Unfortunately, the court did not advance the inter-
pretation of the PPRPA beyond the analysis of the Bolton court.
Instead, the Sanderson court largely repeated the Bolton arguments.
The most recent attempt to construe the PPRPA occured in
Trent v. Lancaster General Hospital."' The defendant-hospital
sought protection from discovery of information provided during In-
fection Review Committee" 2 proceedings. The court, however, lim-
ited its analysis to a narrow issue as framed by the plaintiff." 3 Thus
134. Bolton, 105 Dauph. Co. Rep. at 46.
135. Id. at 49.
136. 158 PA. LEGIS. J., H.B. 1729 (daily ed. May 7, 1974).
137. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 425.4 (Purdon 1985).
138. Cumberland L.J. 612 (C.P. Cumb. Co. 1985).
139. Id. at 613.
140. Id. at 618.
141. 70 Lanc. L. Rev. 170 (1986).
142. This committee is charged with the duty to evaluate and control patient infections
which are acquired during hospital admissions.
143. The court noted:
Plaintiff, however, in his brief, has limited the information which he seeks to
discover to information concerning infection control policies and procedures and
the rate of occurrence of staphilococcus aureus infections in other patients at
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the opinion does not provide a broad based analysis of the PPRPA.
The utility of the opinions for purposes of construing the PPRPA is
further limited as, this court as did the Sanderson court before it,
merely parroted the language of Bolton. Since the plaintiff requested
information not specific to the plaintiffs case, the court, relying on
Bolton ruled the requested information was not protected by the
PPRPA.
3. Summary
The Pennsylvania appellate courts are now faced with the prob-
lem of reconciling the conflicting interpretations of the PPRPA.
Lower courts have not paid strict attention to the language of the
PPRPA in their interpretations. Decisions which too strictly construe
the PPRPA are allowing plaintiffs benefits which were not intended
by the legislature. On the other hand, decisions which give too broad
a construction to the PPRPA effectively remove peer review organi-
zations from public accountability and could hinder a plaintiff from
pursuing a legitimate claim.
V. Conclusion
Judicial interpretations of the PPRPA have produced a conflict
in Pennsylvania law. Consequently, medical professionals are unsure
as to which of their peer review proceedings will receive protection
from discovery. As long as this conflict remains unresolved, medical
malpractice litigation will continue to provoke excessive controversy.
It is now incumbent upon the Pennsylvania Superior Court to resolve
the differences among the county courts regarding the protection af-
forded by the PPRPA.
The solution the superior court fashions must take into account
all of the competing interests and perceptions. Although reconcilia-
tion of polar views seems impossible, workable solutions can be de-
veloped and implemented. The point of departure for the Pennsylva-
nia solution should be the legislative intent behind the PPRPA.
Clearly, the state legislature determined it was necessary to protect
the proceedings of peer review committees by extending a privilege.
Because privileges stand in the way of finding out the truth, they are
not created without careful thought and attention to the competing
defendant hospital during the year of plaintiff's three hospitalizations. We there-
fore limit our inquiry and discussion to those interrogatories and requests for
production of documents which seek to elicit that information.
Trent, 70 Lanc. L. Rev. at 171.
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interests they affect. Since the legislature deemed it necessary to ex-
tend a confidentiality privilege, the superior court should adopt a po-
sition which affords broad protection to the proceedings of review
committees."
4
Judicial support of peer review protection will produce two clear
results. First, the PPRPA will be interpreted in such a way as to
implement the legislative intent. Peer review proceedings will receive
actual protection and not just the nominal protection offered by the
holdings of the Dauphin, Cumberland and Lancaster County Courts.
Second, public policy will be served by providing physicians a forum
in which to aggressively attack the problem of medical negligence
without fear of legal reprisal. Naturally, this second result is desired
by all parties-physicians, attorneys, and patients.
Unfortunately, both attorneys and the public remain uncon-
vinced that physicians will aggressively and fairly police their ranks.
Doubt exists that granting peer review protection will indeed reduce
the severity of the medical malpractice crisis. Physicians, on the
other hand, refuse to proceed with peer review in the absence of pro-
tection. It is therefore suggested that the judiciary support the integ-
rity of peer review proceedings and interpret the PPRPA as provid-
ing a broad privilege. At the same time, the legislature should
recognize the concerns of the public and create a higher authority to
which peer review groups should mandatorily report their findings. If
this authority is a non-partisan arm of the State Medical Licensing
Board, the public will be assured that negligent physicians will be
properly censured and will be subject to the risk of license
revocation.
Implementation of the above policy will have several results.
Most importantly, the quality of medical care will improve as effec-
tive quality review is made possible. Since physicians are best quali-
144. This position is obviously supported by the medical community. The American Bar
Association (ABA) has also adopted this position. In 1976 the ABA House of Delegates
adopted the following resolution:
ir/esolved, that the American Bar Association, recognizing the importance of a
strong medical discipline system in each state, and recognizing further that the
effectiveness of medical disciplinary proceedings has been hampered by physi-
cians' fears of civil liability and the disclosure of confidential material, supports
the following recommendation regarding . . . confidentiality for medical discipli-
nary proceedings:
2. Confidentiality - Except as specifically authorized by law, the proceedings,
records, and findings of a medical disciplinary board should be confidential and
not subject to discovery or introduction into evidence in a civil proceeding.
Holbrook, supra note 51, at 67 (quoting resolutions adopted by the ABA House of Delegates
(August 10, 1976)).
PEER REVIEW
fled to evaluate medical care, they should be allowed to do so. Public
fears that physicians are not effectively policing themselves will be
allayed since peer review groups will be made accountable for their
actions. Finally, physicians' complaints of rising costs will be an-
swered since a reduction of medical negligence will lead to a reduc-
tion in the number of law suits, which will eventually lead to lower
premiums for liability insurance, or, at least, reduce the current rate
of increase in the cost of liability insurance.
Joseph A. Ricci

